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The address I am going to make today is about the economic development in association with the security issues in the region where Romania is located – the so-called “enlarged Black Sea zone”. This region – that includes, besides Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan and that borders another two sensitive regions, i.e. the western Balkans (the theatre of the most recent European war) and the Near East – has been long considered problematic, yet of no interest. The western European policy would even make it a practice, in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, to deem this region of no strategical interest to the European policy. This practice extended to the 20 th century as well, and the United Stated adopted and shared it.
After the fall of communism and the dismantlement of USSR , the region became one of the problematic zones of the European continent. The tensions and latent conflicts that the cold war had kept frozen popped up and took most violent forms. Local wars broke out in former Yugoslavia , in the Caucasus , in the Republic of Moldova , and many tensions and controversies worsened the relations between most of the countries in the region. Nobody denied the security issues in the region, but the perception of the region as one of lesser importance endured. For the western European democracies, the relationships with Russia and the integration of Central Europe used to come first. South-eastern Europe and the Black Sea zone could wait; and indeed they waited until the beginning of the third millennium when a radical changeover occurred.
On 6 December 2005, the Romanian Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement. Under this agreement, Romania will share military facilities and training areas with U.S. forces. In less diplomatic terms, it allows US military bases on the Romanian territory. Russia reacted immediately. At the Russia – NATO Council meeting late in December 2005, the Russian foreign and defence ministers showed their dissatisfaction with the Romanian-American agreement, saying that it represented an infringement of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Russian vision is that this represents an expansion to the east of NATO – i.e. of the United States – to the detriment of Russia, or, possibly, against it. Romania is just one case on a long list including the change of the political regimes in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004 in favour of political forces that are closer to Washington and that Pravda (5 January 2006) defines as willing to adhere to the North-Atlantic organisation. The same Pravda reads that the Republic of Moldova as well makes efforts to replace the Russian peace keeping forces from Transdniestria with NATO forces. Lately, the Russian diplomacy initiated a parallel between the Western solution to the Kosovo issue (autonomy, but not independence from Serbia) and the solution for solving the Abkhazia problem. The two issues, seemingly local, are thus interconnected, bridging the Black Sea.
The list of examples is much longer, but those herein before are revealing enough to outline the substance of the changeover I was speaking about: the so far local issues between small countries or states of no strategical importance have turned into manifestations of the global security problematique. All of a sudden, we no longer speak of the relationships between Moldovans and Transdniestrians, but of those between NATO, the EU and Russia. The problematique of the inter-ethnic relations in Georgia – that generated the Abkhazia issue – is at present a matter of the relations between Russia, the United States, Germany and France. And so on and so forth. Consequently, the relations between the states in the region are no longer manifestations of the local issues alone, and they are directly and considerably influenced by the relations of these countries with the important actors of the global policies. This is a recent evolution likely to become defining at least for this decade, probably for the next one as well.
The second characteristic of the regional security in the Black Sea zone, which is just emerging, is that its problematique – as a manifestation and competition theatre of global relations – evolves concurrently with, yet independently from the bilateral relationships between global actors (USA, EU, Russia, China, NATO, UNO, etc.). This needs no further analysis. In November 2005, Vladimir Putin stated before some Dutch journalists that Russia would be delighted to become a NATO and EU member, and that it did not deem NATO a hostile organisation. One month later, the Russian foreign and defence ministers “worry” about the American bases in Romania – a NATO member country and, shortly, a member of the EU. This is not about different visions of the Russian leaders, or a turn in the Russian policy; this is just a different approach of two aspects – global and local – of the same issue. Likewise, the Russian-American, Russian-German, and American-German relationships are, at bilateral and global level, up-and-coming. The recent accord of both Russia and China to accept the American-west-European initiative to bring forward the Iran issue before the United Nations is a leap forward in this direction. Yet, there is no secret though that Russia and the West compete for the zones of influence, and that the Black Sea expanse is the theatre of much of this competition. The so-called “coloured revolutions” from Georgia and Ukraine, the pressure put on Belarus, the change of political orientation in Moldova, the efforts of all camps to have a say in the political evolutions in the Caucasus countries, etc. are evidence of this competition where each camp tries to consolidate its position: the West by using civic movements and the perspective of the assistance granted through NATO and the EU, and Russia by using nationalist and energy policies. The forthcoming elections in Ukraine in March caused both the critical statements of the Secretary of State with regard to Russia, and the energy conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The twofold approach of the same issue – global security and global power relationships – does not make the approach any easier. At present, the interrelation between the two categories of issues is unclear. During the cold war, the solution was clear-cut and simple: the agreements at global level dictated the solutions at local level. This clearcutness disappeared. The influence of the global agreements upon local issues has diminished considerably. The fact that the global level is mainly dominated by cooperation while the local level is mainly dominated by competition is not the result of the hypocrisy of the political actors from the big powers' capitals; it is largely the result of the call for international support of local actors. I would remind here a Romanian proverb saying that the little log overturns the great cart . There is a widely acknowledged conclusion that globalisation does not diminish but on the contrary, it enhances the importance of local actors and their capacity to influence global relationships. I was saying that the local problematique in the enlarged Black Sea region has a tendency to be a manifestation of the latent aspects of the global security problematique and of the power relationships between the big global actors. This goes the other way round as well though: the small local issues have a tendency to find expression in the global power relationships, and to influence the latter. Consider the political confrontation between Iuschenko and Ianukovich in Ukraine. It can be deemed an expression of the confrontation between the West and Russia for Ukraine. This is a vision adopted by many. Yet, it would be naïve to define these two politicians as the mere representatives of the political interests of Washington and Moscow, respectively. Actually, they are genuine politicians expressing, first and foremost, the political interests of different groups from Ukraine. Therefore, the vision according to which a local Ukrainian political confrontation can generate problems in terms of global political relationships is also true. This is about an important U-turn in the mechanism of working out solutions. Until lately, local issues were addressed through solutions at global level. At present, we have entered a new stage when local solutions open vistas to new global relations.
I dare say we may define the security problematique in the enlarged Black Sea zone – that largely overlaps, at present, the “enlarged Europe” problematique – as an example case of a new evolution of global security issues. I have already outlined two characteristics of this vision. The first one refers to the fact that local security issues have a tendency to become the expression of latent issues in the global security relationships. The second characteristic refers to the fact that local security issues have a tendency to turn – as a result of the integration of local actors in the global security networks – into factors that influence the global relationships. There is also a third characteristic that I would like to stress; it refers to what I would call the end of the geopolitical approach . I will elaborate on this aspect, as I deem it of great consequence.
I dare remind you that for four decades, the cold war prioritised on the ideological confrontation between systems, and that what used to be called realpolitik – the vision on the international policy developed in the 19 th century – was relegated the back seat, even if it kept on influencing the political and strategic thinking. The fall of communism brought the paradigmatic and ideological victory of the geopolitical approaches. The USA is a notable exception to the rule – it continued to define its foreign policy mostly in ideological terms, promoting democracy and the free market economy at world level. The rule of the geopolitical paradigm caused the accusations of political hypocrisy made against the ideological principles promoted by the USA in its foreign policy, as it was the case with the Iraq war.
Geopolitics largely spells geoeconomy, and the geographical distribution of energy resources is, according to theorists, the core of the geographical distribution of the economy. Defining global relationships and the major security issues in terms of the competition for the energy resources of the planet is just a step away, one that has been taken quite easily. Too easily, I should say.
A reverse correlation distribution of capital and energy resources represents a particularity of the present economic geography: capital has developed in the countries with no or scarce energy resources (USA, Japan, Western Europe), while energy resources are to be found in the countries with poor capital (Russia, Near East, Central and South America, Africa). This is a fact, but in politics, facts often come second. The vision of the political actors takes precedence. A famous British physicist used to say that we know about the universe as much as theory allows us to know. This is the more so in politics. When politicians have a geopolitical approach of the world reality, this is what they get – a geopolitical reality dominated by the problematique of the access of capital to energy resources. Thus, Russia's foreign policy will be dominated by the oil and gas pipeline policy . Russia run by politicians defining the world in terms of geopolitics will do exactly what it does at present – it will renegotiate the gas contracts with the satellites, it will build pipelines across the Baltic Sea to Germany and across Siberia to China and Japan, and it will fight for control over the pipelines distributing non-Russian energy, such as the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. This approach provides a simple explanation of part of the Russian policy in Central Asia. (The pipeline meets economic needs, but its route is the response to a geopolitical vision.) Apart from the local aspects, the global approach has its say. Recent statements made by Putin imply that the Soviet military doctrine considers giving up the no enemy theory and replacing it with the one enemy doctrine – enemy that has not been identified yet.
I believe both visions, the ideological and the geopolitical, are too simple for such a complicated world as this. In the Black Sea region where I come from, the alternation of these visions generates confusion, uncertainty, and problems that endure. The ideological vision proposes the West to support the more democratic political regimes and to advocate for the extension of democracy to the east, possibly even for the change of the political regime in Moscow, through civic movements and pro-West politicians. The geopolitical vision, on the contrary, proposes strengthening relationships with Moscow and with the political regimes that pledge to guarantee energy security in Europe and beyond, possibly condoning certain derogations from democracy and the observance of human rights. The western and American politicians have made use of both visions but there was no happy ending. In its turn, Russia swinged between the two visions, making concessions to one or the other, always strengthening the alternative. The local security issues worsened instead of being solved, and the region has remained one of the least developed and most fertile in terms of problem generation in Europe.
I dare put forward a more complicated vision. Last year, during a series of debates here, in Washington, I proposed a vision I called the development vision . In short, it says that all societies look for development sources, that development sources are concentrated in a few regions, and that no security issues develop between countries resorting to the same development resource. Security issues are generated by countries that either swing between alternative development sources (Ukraine between the western world and Russia, Palestine between the western world and the Islamic world, etc.), or lack access to development sources and try to build ad-hoc development, through own forces (Iran, North Korea, certain south-American countries, etc.). Consequences are not just theoretical in nature; they can also be extremely practical. Among others, they presume that the policies in regions such as the Black Sea expanse shift from objectives related to political regimes (the ideological vision) or objectives related to energy and military security (geopolitical vision), to objectives related to economic and social development, which does in no way mean ignoring the ideological or energy issues. After all, development is an equation with at least six terms: political democracy, capital, energy, people, knowledge, and the environment. I wish to stress that presently, no country (with the notable exception of Norway(?), maybe) has solved all the issues of all the six parameters. Approaching all the six parameters at the same time is clearly more difficult than approaching them one or two at a time, but I dare say it is also more efficient.
To the Black Sea region, this would mean deciding in favour of either the European Union or the United States, or a combination of the two as development source for the countries in the relevant expanse. This is not the case yet, and countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine – what Donald Rumsfeld once called the new Europe – had to swing between the European Union and the United States precisely at a time when the relationships between the two worsened (during the Iraq war). Romania's situation is to its advantage at present – it has a strategic partnership with the USA and gets ready to become an EU member, – yet the uncertainty related to the development source remains. This uncertainty is even bigger with the other states in the region where a third or even a fourth alternative development resource emerges – Russia or the Islamic world, or even China.
That is why I was quite disappointed when an American official announced during a debate in Washington that no new Marshall Plan was envisaged for Eastern Europe in particular and for the new Euro-Atlantic expansion zone in the Black Sea expanse, including Russia. In fact, a Marshall Plan would be insufficient for this zone. What is really needed is an American-west-European alliance aiming at the integrated development of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea zone (including Turkey and the Caucasus).
I know that no such project is on the agenda of the Euro-Atlantic community and that many of you will deem it a utopia. I will just remark the empirical fact that the countries in the region take action, even if non-systematically and in an oscillating manner, towards such a cooperation with the western world, catching the latter somehow unprepared at times. Turkey has applied for the EU accession and, in the absence of a well-defined vision of the European politicians, its accession generated lively disputes throughout Europe. Ukraine and Moldova try to reconsider their position, looking towards both the EU and NATO. Russia itself not just makes political statements regarding the partnership with NATO and the EU; it also encourages massive western investment not only in the power generation industry, but in top branches as well such as the IT or the mechanical engineering.
Despite its somehow better situation that I have mentioned herein before – NATO membership, strategic partnership with the United States, forthcoming EU accession, – Romania illustrates very clearly the deficiencies of the partial approach as against the global one, in terms of the six essential variables of development. Romania is a strategic partner of the United States in Eastern Europe, a member of the coalition in Iraq, a participant in the peace-keeping force in Afghanistan, etc., yet its trade with the United States is in the range of one billion euros, i.e. 2.8 per cent of total Romanian foreign trade (in 2003). Romania is closely connected to the western world in political terms, yet the net foreign capital investments in Romania in 2003 were less than 1 per cent of total investments made that year. A turn for the better has been registered for the last two years; nevertheless, it is obvious that under such conditions, Romania's rapid development perspectives with all the six development parameters are not exceptional. Most of them are European. The American ones are insignificant.
Nevertheless, I am optimistic. I believe that even if at a much slower pace than we Romanians would like it, the reality works for us. In 1998, France was trying to talk the United States into giving Romania green light for joining NATO, and the United States was trying to talk France and Germany into giving Romania green light for the EU accession. Only a few years later, the situation is completely different – Romania is a NATO member and is about to become an EU member as well. I expect things to evolve at the same rapid pace based on constantly replacing the traditional, 20 th century approaches with new ones more adequate to the 21 st century. One of the changeovers I expect in the short-run is to stop considering South-eastern Europe as a region of no strategical importance, a buffer-zone between the West and Russia, but as one of the regions whose rapid development can be an enabler for solving certain topical regional an global security issues.